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Research Article
Cyber anomaly detection: Using
tabulated vectors and embedded
analytics for efficient data mining
Robert J Gutierrez1, Kenneth W Bauer1,
Bradley C Boehmke1 , Cade M Saie2 and Trevor J Bihl3
Abstract
Firewalls, especially at large organizations, process high velocity internet traffic and flag suspicious events and activities.
Flagged events can be benign, such as misconfigured routers, or malignant, such as a hacker trying to gain access to a
specific computer. Confounding this is that flagged events are not always obvious in their danger and the high velocity
nature of the problem. Current work in firewall log analysis is manual intensive and involves manpower hours to find
events to investigate. This is predominantly achieved by manually sorting firewall and intrusion detection/prevention
system log data. This work aims to improve the ability of analysts to find events for cyber forensics analysis. A tabulated
vector approach is proposed to create meaningful state vectors from time-oriented blocks. Multivariate and graphical
analysis is then used to analyze state vectors in human–machine collaborative interface. Statistical tools, such as the
Mahalanobis distance, factor analysis, and histogram matrices, are employed for outlier detection. This research also
introduces the breakdown distance heuristic as a decomposition of the Mahalanobis distance, by indicating which
variables contributed most to its value. This work further explores the application of the tabulated vector approach
methodology on collected firewall logs. Lastly, the analytic methodologies employed are integrated into embedded
analytic tools so that cyber analysts on the front-line can efficiently deploy the anomaly detection capabilities.
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Introduction
Due to the constantly changing behavior of cyber-
attacks, reactive approaches are desirable to detect
and prevent malicious actors from gaining access to
networks. Firewalls and intrusion detection and pre-
vention systems (IDPS) are a line of defense in identi-
fying and stopping suspicious internet traffic. When a
suspicious event occurs, these devices generate a log file
containing details of what preprogrammed rules were
violated and how it was handled.1 Such log files contain
details of the event, e.g. source and destination IP
addresses, port numbers, and protocols, but not the
packet and data that led to the event. Of interest is
cyber/digital forensics of logged events to understand
their origin and magnitude.2,3 Suspicious events include
both malicious and non-malicious activities, e.g. mis-
configured routers; however, each event is logged and
to find malicious events for further analysis, one must
search through all logged suspicious events.
Although advances have been made in applying text
mining and advanced analytics to cyber log data
analysis, c.f. Suh-Lee et al.4 Breier and Branisova´5
and Villa et al.,6 the characteristics of cyber logs results
in much manual analysis for interpretation and
response.7–10 When considering log data, cyber analysts
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rely on manual sorting and experiential knowledge to
find possible threats in logged events to further inves-
tigate.7,11,12 Thus, cyber security is heavily experiential-
based and uses the innate ability of humans to process
large amounts of complex data;13 similarly experience
is critical and novice analysts might miss intrusions and
events that a veteran analyst would not.14 Additionally,
cyber intrusion detection is asymmetrical in nature
whereby an attacker can focus on only one threat
approach while a defender (cyber analyst) must con-
stantly protect all systems and prepare for many differ-
ent types of attacks, vulnerabilities and threats.15
Although system administrators and cyber analysts
manually handle log data, this is becoming increasingly
infeasible due to the big data nature of cyber traffic
(unstructured, high volume and high velocity16).
Normal behavior for cyber networks is generally not
well defined and changes over time, resulting in high
false positive detection rates.17 Additionally, since fire-
wall log events are the result of network abnormalities,
one is thus necessarily interested in detecting the anom-
alies within the anomalies. Related research, c.f.
Lazarevic et al.,18 Denning,19 Garcıa-Teodoro et al.,20
Grimaila et al.,21 Moore et al.,22 Dube et al.,23
Shilland,24 Shen et al.,25 Stewart et al.26 has focused
on anomaly detection at the device/software level,
with little21,27–32 exploration into anomaly detection
in the log files generated from the preexisting devices
or software.
For analysis, data were used from a large scale dis-
tributed network with regional data nodes much like
the Microsoft Cyber Defense Center, the Verizon
Network Operations Center, or AT&T Global
Network Operations Center. Currently, data is
analyzed from enterprise-wide networks, which rely
on a series of firewalls and IDPS to identify and stop
intrusions. These devices, when triggered, generate a
log file containing details of how it handled each inci-
dent, such as the source and destination IP addresses,
port numbers, protocols, bytes transferred, etc.
However, due to the wide variety of devices adding
observations to the log, the data can be highly variable.
In operation, analysts employ an experiential approach
whereby large log files are manually sorted to find
anomalies to further investigate; this process is concep-
tualized in Figure 1(a). However, due to the large size
of the network and quantity of users, the data is of
significant volume and emerging at high velocity; thus
representative of a big data problem. Currently, ana-
lysts inspect numerous potential incidents on a daily
basis, but have neither the time nor the resources avail-
able to analyze all incidents contained in the logs.
This paper combines statistical and visual
methods and integrates them into embedded
analytic applications to assist analysts in the manual
analysis of firewall logs. To this end, the authors devel-
op a tabulated vector approach (TVA) that processes
firewall log files to identify anomalies within the
flagged firewall log event data. The TVA process
employed by the authors is similar to that of Winding
et al.,27 wherein pre-defined data attributes are consid-
ered. The developed process is automated and data
attributes are transformed into representative counts,
e.g. the number of times a certain IP address appears
within the timespan of interest. Descriptive statistics
are then computed for these counts with the result
being the tabulated vector for a given period of
time period.
Figure 1. Cyber firewall log analysis methods: (a) Standard, manual intensive, cyber anomaly detection approach; (b) proposed
methodology for analyst-aided multivariate firewall log anomaly detection.
294 Journal of Algorithms & Computational Technology 12(4)
The authors propose an analyst-aided solution to
cue system administrators and analysts to anomalies
for further analysis when manual log file analysis and
forensics are employed. The end goal is that seen in
Figure 1(b), wherein log files are selected, these are
then divided into time blocks. From here, tabulated
vectors are computed for the time blocks. These tabu-
lated vectors are then processed through statistical and
graphical methods. Finally, analysts are cued to
various blocks of interest within a given log data file.
The purpose of this approach is to efficiently analyze
abnormal activities so that cyber analysts can dedicate
their time to researching potential threats.
This paper is organized as follows: “Background”
section reviews background details on cyber networks,
cyber threats, and cyber technologies. “Developing a sta-
tistical framework for cyber anomaly detection” section
3 presents statistical pattern recognition methods that
consider handling unstructured data through numerical
approaches. “TVA for firewall log analysis” section dis-
cusses the development of a framework to detect firewall
log anomalies. “Embedded analytics” section discusses
how the proposed methodology was embedded into ana-
lytic applications for use by cyber analysts, and
“Conclusions” section concludes the paper.
Background
In order to analyze cyber log data, one must discuss the
basics of cyber networks, firewalls, IDPS, and charac-
teristics of cyber log data. In this paper, we will discuss
the salient characteristics of these areas.
Cyber networks
Figure 2 presents a conceptualization of a basic cyber
network where user PCs are protected by an intrusion
detection system (IDS) or intrusion prevention system
(IPS), collectively IDPS, and a firewall.33 Each security
device plays a crucial role in protecting the user’s com-
puter from outside and inside threats. Both IDPS and
firewalls monitor network traffic and either stop or flag
events that violate their rules. When an event triggers a
rule, details are logged along with the action taken by
the firewall or IDPS.
Firewalls. Firewalls provide a first level of protection
between an internal (e.g. local area network (LAN))
and external (e.g. internet) network. Firewalls employ
rules to determine the outcome of an event34 and pre-
vent risks, including: (1) an internal host system’s expo-
sure to inherently insecure Internet protocols and
services, and (2) probes and attacks launched from
hosts on the Internet.35 A wide variety of firewalls
exist, including both commercially developed and
open source systems.36 Presently, firewalls employed
in the operational network of interest include those
manufactured by Palo Alto Networks, Cisco ASA,
McAfee, and Norton 360.
Firewalls are of three general types:35 (1) packet fil-
tering (PF), (2) proxy gateway, and (3) circuit level
inspection. In brief, PF firewalls consider each incom-
ing and outgoing packet, apply predefined rules to ana-
lyze the packet and decide to allow it to proceed
or not.35 Proxy gateways, also known as servers, act
as a security filter.35 Circuit level inspection firewalls
Figure 2. Generic cyber network.
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use a proxy server that employs an access control list to
determine if a request is permitted.
Intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDPS)
Intrusion detection involves monitoring and logging
network traffic to detect attempts to gain unauthorized
network access which are evident by security policy
violations and acceptable use policy.37 Intrusion pre-
vention goes one step further by attempting to stop
such incidents. Therefore, IDPS must identify possible
incidents and when one occurs, a log of information
about the event and the course of action is generated.37
Similar to firewalls, IDPS employs a set of rules related
to signatures or anomalies.37 IDPSs can be setup in
two ways, host based (HIDS) or network based
(NIDS), where the former is deployed on each individ-
ual computer while the latter is positioned along
the network.37
Cyber anomaly detection in firewall logs
While one could find that a given firewall log file con-
tains entirely malicious events, one likely has the prob-
lem of too many false positives in the log data. False
positive issues in cyber anomaly detection involve too
many benign events being logged and thus obscuring
the rare malicious activities.38 Since firewall logs con-
tain anomalous events detected within network traffic
and since many of these are not threats from attackers,
one is thus interested in finding anomalies among
anomalies. Two general paradigms exist for this task:
(i) experiential, or manually searching through logs
based on subjective experiences and (ii) statistical or
machine learning approaches to find observations of
interest in the log data.
Experiential approaches
In general, the work of cyber analysts is manual inten-
sive and involves queries and searches of a dataset.7,11
Experiential approaches work by taking a log files,
employing various sorting and analysis tools (e.g.
Snort and Kibana), and incorporating contextual
information to understand an event.11 The process is
conceptualized in Figure 1(a), where only two column
searches are considered, which illustrates the manual
nature of sorting by individual columns until one
finds observations that display suspicious behavior.
While such an approach could be highly accurate, it
is time consuming and requires a year or more of on
the job experience11 and learning of various firewall
forensics attributes.39
Statistical data analysis
Statistical data analysis involves using mathematical
approaches to find patterns in datasets.13,40
Approaches for doing so range from supervised
(known classes/groups in the data) to unsupervised
(unknown classes/groups in the data). Statistical data
analysis thus includes classification methods where
classes are known, at least in the training data, to clus-
tering methods for which classes are unknown and one
aims to find groupings in the data.13 In cyber analysis,
one can divide the field into academic and operational
approaches. While academic approaches to cyber anal-
ysis frequently have the luxury of knowing if behaviors
are threats or not, c.f. Grimaila et al.,21 Moore et al.,22
operational cyber analysis does not have the luxury of
canonical truth. Thus, statistical analysis of cyber data
is frequently unsupervised in operation.
Since a variety of methods have been proposed to
analyze firewall logs via statistical or machine learning
methods, of interest is thus leveraging past concepts
and ideas to create a method to aid analysts in analyz-
ing and interpreting firewall log data. A variety of
approaches exist in this domain, c.f. Lazarevic
et al.,18 Garcıa-Teodoro et al.,20 and include text ana-
lytics,41 support vector machines,18 random forests,42
event correlation,21,30,43–46 dynamic rule creation,29
and principal component analysis.20,47,48 Of particular
interest is the work of Denning,49 who originally
proposed using anomaly detection methods in cyber
security. This has been consistently extended and
expanded upon, as seen in Lazarevic et al.,18 Garcıa-
Teodoro et al.,20 Zhang and Zulkernine,42 Shyu et al.,47
Wang and Battiti,48 Lazarevic et al.,50 Ahmed et al.,51
Liao et al.,1 and Patcha and Park.52
Cyber network and data of interest
Of interest to the authors are general firewall log files,
one task is handling all firewall logs from the many
networks the enterprise has worldwide. For context,
the operational approach to the data collection process
is conceptualized in Figure 3. For data handling, raw
logs are first normalized into a structured data file by a
connector, a stand-alone device or software that for-
wards data and sometimes converts from one format to
another. These are then forwarded to regional centers
(RC). RCs are organizations that provide regional
services while simultaneously defending the network
from cyber threats.53 At the RCs, a regional security
information and event management (SIEM) device
aggregates, correlates, monitors, and generates alerts
from the received data. Next, a second connector for-
wards the data to a global SIEM known as the integra-
tion center (IC). After the data is reprocessed at the IC,
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it is then uploaded into a big data platform—a central-
ized database for managing big data,7 both structured
and unstructured, at high volume and high velocity.16
From here, data can be queried and analyzed.
Developing a statistical framework
for cyber anomaly detection
In order to develop a statistical framework for firewall
log analysis, the authors posit that a multivariate data-
set containing only numeric values is necessary. To this
aim, the authors work towards feature vector creation
and then statistical and graphical analysis of this fea-
ture vector.
Feature vector creation
One technique to facilitate the application of statistical
methods to log files is the feature vector method pro-
posed by Winding et al.,27 and further applied in Breier
and Branisova29 Syurahbil et al.54 This approach
aggregates log file observations into a set of feature
vectors, which can then be analyzed through statistical
approaches, which require the data to be numeric. In
brief, a feature vector is a count of occurrences for the
unique values in a set of variables.27 Inherently, this
involves dividing the data into blocks or regions of
sequential observations.
A conceptualization is presented in Figure 4. In
Figure 4(a), we have an example of two columns of
raw data in a given block. Field A is categorical
and field B is numeric. A feature vector can be created
by condensing these observations into a block row,
Figure 4(b). Unique categorical features in field A
become columns of block 1. The count of each
unique categorical feature in that block then becomes
the value. Numerical entries in field B the original
data are then summed with that value placed in the
column for B.
When applying the feature vector approach to fire-
wall log data, Winding et al.,27 took log file records
with the following raw data fields:
• Repeated attempts of access by a single IP,
• Number of source IPs per destination IP,
• Number of destination IPs per source IP,
• Number of destination ports on a given source/
destination IP pair,
• Unique IPs,
• Maximum activity from a single IP,
• Failed and successful connections from the same IP,
• Attempts to access invalid IPs,
• Inbound/Outbound bytes per unit time.
and then condensed these into feature vectors with the
following variables:
• Source IP address, number of destination
IP addresses,
• Destination IP, number of failed access attempts,
• Source IP, destination IP,
• Destination perspective vector (destination IP, count
of source IPs, number of successful accesses, number
of failed accesses, count of destination ports,
number of bytes transferred (inbound), number of
bytes transferred (outbound)).
Figure 3. Generic representation of the data collection hierarchy.
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Mahalanobis based anomaly detection
To find anomalies inside a feature vector, one approach
is the Mahalanobis distance, which is a multivariate
outlier detection expression, which compares each
observation by its distance from the data mean, inde-
pendent of scale.55 The Mahalanobis distance is com-
puted as
MD ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x xð ÞC1 x xð Þ
p
(1)
where x is a vector of p observations, x ¼ x1; . . . ; xpð Þ,
x is the mean vector of the data, x ¼ x1 ; . . . ; xpð Þ, and
C1 is the inverse data covariance matrix.55 Once
computed, MD values can be sorted with anomalies
identified by relative magnitudes.
Breakdown distance
However, one limitation is usingMD is that it does not
provide a rationale for what is or is not an anomaly.
Therefore, we propose the use of a “breakdown dis-
tance” (BD)
BDi ¼
 xi  xið ÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃCiip
 (2)
where xi is a given variable, xi is the mean of the var-
iable, and Cii is the variance of xi. The advantage of
equation (2) is that scaling by variance enables one
to measure of the relative contribution of each variable
to MD scores.
Principal components and factor analysis
Principal components analysis (PCA) is a linear trans-
formation method which involves computing the data
covariance, or correlation, matrix eigen-solution pro-
jecting the data by these eigenvectors.56 The resultant
projection is of uncorrelated components, with each
component explaining successively less variation in
the data, per the eigenvalues.56 PCA is a dimensionality
reduction method because one can select a small
amount of components which explain a large amount
of the variance in the data. PCA was applied to IDPS
event analysis by Garcia-Teodoro et al.;20 Shyu et al.,47
proposed using minor components (those whose vari-
ance explained is less than 0.20), claiming that their
method can distinguish whether an outlier is an
extreme value or it does not have the same correlation
structure as the “normal” data.
Similar to PCA, factor analysis (FA) is another
dimensionality reduction technique designed to identify
underlying structure of the data. FA relates the corre-
lations between variables through a set of factors to
link together seemingly unrelated variables.56,57
An additional step seen in FA is that it can rotate the
original solution seen in PCA, in order to possibly find
more structure in the data. The basic FA model is
X ¼ Kf þ e (3)
where X is the vector of responses X ¼ x1; . . . ; xpð Þ, f
are the common factors f ¼ f1; . . . ; fq
 
, e is the unique
factors e ¼ e1; . . . ; epð Þ, and K is the factor loadings.56
Figure 4. Generic feature vector creation process. (a) Example raw data; (b) resultant feature vector.
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For the desired results, this research uses the correla-
tion matrix. Factor loadings are correlations between
the factors and the original data and can thus range
from 1 to 1, which indicate how much that factor
affects each variable.56 Values close to 0 imply a
weak effect on the variable.
A factor loading matrix can be computed to under-
stand how each original data variable is related to the
resultant factors.56 This can be computed as
K ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k1e1; . . . ;
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
kpep
pq 
(4)
where ki is the eigenvalue for each factor, ei is the eigen-
vector for each factor, and p is the number of col-
umns.56 Factor scores are used to examine the
behavior of the observations relative to each factor.
This research will plot factor scores against one anoth-
er as a method for anomaly detection. Using equation
(4), the scores are calculated as
bf ¼ XsR1K (5)
where Xs is the standardized observations, R
1 is the
inverse of the correlation matrix, and K is the factor
loadings matrix.56 To simplify the results for interpre-
tation, the factor loadings can undergo an orthogonal
or oblique rotation.58 Orthogonal rotations assume
independence between the factors while oblique rota-
tions allow the factors to correlate. For this research,
we utilize the most common rotation option known as
varimax.59 Varimax rotates the factors orthogonally to
maximize the variance of the squared factor loadings
which forces large factors to increase and small ones to
decrease, providing easier interpretation.
To assess the quality of a factor analysis solution,
Kaiser60 proposed the index of factorial simplicity
(IFS) that measures the tendency towards unifactorial-
ity for both a given row and the entire matrix as a
whole. Computing IFS values consistent with
Kaiser,60 we can evaluate the quality for a factor anal-
ysis solution with the heuristic labels shown in Table 1.
Since the purpose of factor analysis is for dataset
reduction, we consider the three generally accepted
methods of determining the dimensionality for correla-
tion matrix inputs.56,61 The first and most commonly
used is Kaiser’s Criterion62 which advises to retain
those factors whose eigenvalues are greater than 1.0.
Second is Cattell’s scree test63 which involves graphing
the eigenvalues and retaining those that form the steep
curve. The third method is a modified scree test called
Horn’s parallel analysis (i.e. Horn’s Curve),64 that uses
a Monte Carlo simulation to find the average eigenval-
ues. Due to the advantages of Horn’s parallel analysis,
the authors employed this method herein to determine
the number of factors to explore.
Visualizations
Graphical analytic tools enable an analyst to visualize
insights that may not be readily apparent without man-
ually examining the data.65 Appropriate visualizations
are key to cyber data analysis, c.f. Schweitzer and
Fulton,66 thus the authors present a selection of meth-
ods which will be employed to help analysts tell a story
in firewall log data.
Heatmaps
Heatmaps are graphical representations of a data matrix
through the use of a color scale and have been used for
100þ years as an effective visualization approach for a
matrix.67 In statistics, one common use for heatmaps is
for correlation matrices, illustrating the relationship
between variables ranging from 1 to 1.
Histogram matrix
A histogram matrix (HMAT) is a visualization tech-
nique developed by Frei and Rennhard,28 that com-
bines graphical and statistical techniques to aid
security administrators in efficiently identifying anom-
alies. HMAT was designed to scan large log files that
show steady normal behavior and examine the mes-
sages displayed for each observation. HMAT extends
both heatmaps and histograms, where data values are
represented through a series of circles on a grid with the
radius directly corresponding to the magnitude.28
An example HMAT relative to log files is presented
in Figure 5 (taken from Frei and Rennhard28); here
HMAT visualizes time on the x-axis, and the number
of words per message on the y-axis. The size of the
circle in Figure 5 is related to the number of log mes-
sages with the corresponding number of words while
the color serves as indication to the relative likelihood
of the time slot. The authors in Frei and Rennhard28
determined the color of a circle by comparing the dis-
tribution of the sizes of the circles in its column with
previous columns. In Figure 5, the large red circle
Table 1. Kaiser’s evaluation of the IFS levels.61
IFS level Evaluation
In the 0.90s Marvelous
In the 0.80s Meritorious
In the 0.70s Middling
In the 0.60s Mediocre
In the 0.50s Miserable
Below 0.50 Unacceptable
IFS: index of factorial simplicity.
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indicates an unusually large amount of messages, great-
er than 5 standard deviations from the norm. HMAT
also provides user interaction, where an administrator
can click on one of the circles to reveal all the log
messages that define that circle.
Network graphs
Network graphs are graphical models that depict a
relationship between two or more nodes, connected
by edges.68,69 Herein, the authors employ network
graphs to illustrate the interaction between source
and destination IP addresses. Of particular interest
are identifying The Onion Router (TOR) related IP
addresses, port scans, and network fingerprinting
attempts. TOR is a network of servers that provides
a user with anonymity by relaying their internet traffic
through multiple encrypted servers.70,71 Probable TOR
nodes can be found and might be related to attempts to
access multiple computers. A port scan is the act of
determining which ports on a network are open and
is thus related with one source IP connecting to many
destination IPs over a short amount of time.72,73
Finally, fingerprinting a network is the act of revealing
the presence of cyber security devices.73 Thus, each
unique IP address is a node. An edge represents the
interaction between sources and destinations with its
thickness denoting the frequency of interactions
between the nodes. For related work, see Swanson.74
TVA for firewall log analysis
Assembling the statistical methods from “Developing a
statistical framework for cyber anomaly detection” sec-
tion together involves a systems engineering approach.
Here, the authors will show how the statistical methods
from “Developing a statistical framework for cyber
anomaly detection” section can be assembled into a
cohesive firewall log analysis framework. Then the
authors will illustrate the utility of their framework
with an example case study.
TVA approach and process
When incorporating the statistical, graphical, and ana-
lytical methods discussed in “Developing a statistical
framework for cyber anomaly detection” section, the
conceptualization that appeared in Figure 1(b) yields
the flow chart seen in Figure 6. Figure 6 presents a
representation of the methodology used operationally
to exploit log data is presented. This process in Figure 6
is broken up into four subsections: pre-processing,
within block analytics, across block analytics, and
graphical analytics. Pre-processing takes the raw data
and transforms it into a form that can be used for sta-
tistical analysis. Statistical analysis utilizes the statisti-
cal tools described in “Developing a statistical
framework for cyber anomaly detection” section to
build the HMAT for anomaly detection. Moving to
within block analytics, histograms are utilized to com-
pare the data between blocks in time. Across block
analytics assesses the entire dataset for similarities or
differences while graphical analytics focuses on deter-
mining the link between observations and IP addresses.
Developing a data analysis platform also involved sys-
tems engineering to select and incorporate available
packages and tools for functionality. R75 was used
due to its growing popularity and open source
nature;76 additionally, R is further available as a soft-
ware tool for big data platforms.
Figure 5. Histogram matrix of mail server message distribution, from Abbott et al.14
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TVA example case study
To illustrate the utility of the proposed firewall log
anomaly detection process, the authors will examine a
representative log file with 39,304 observations and
400þ data features. Due to the nature of the data sour-
ces, IP address and data fields have been obfuscated to
permit the presentation of real data results. Thus, IP
addresses will not be in the traditional XXX.XXX.XX.
XXX format, obfuscated values will appear in figures
and nondescript names (e.g., 239e330c.4c3e44ed.
f54890e4.1a9d80ce) will appear in the text.
Additionally, data fields will be vague and generic.
Data pre-processing
Once data is retrieved, the data must be pre-processed
and then time regional blocks are created, from which
state vectors are extracted and data quality is consid-
ered (e.g. multicollinearity adjustments). These steps
are necessary to incorporate multivariate and graphical
methods for anomaly detection. In this step, variables
of interest are either selected or created to aid in the
discovery of anomalies.
The data used in this research has been collected
from sensors located around the world. While over
400 data fields are collected, for illustrated purposes
this research focuses on the fields shown in Table 2.
These fields were selected based on (i) commonality
between multiple log files and (ii) their ease on
demonstrating the proposed methodology without the
use of text mining techniques. Since some device ven-
dors can have multiple products, we combine the fields
Device_Vendor and Device_Product to form a new var-
iable Device_Name to avoid confusion between the
device the observation originated from.
Time block creation
Following pre-processing and data cleaning, one then
creates time regional blocks. Here, the observations are
divided into sequential time blocks of equal length. The
39,304 observations in the example log file were chro-
nologically separated into 136 time blocks, each con-
taining 289 observations. Figure 7 shows the
categorical variables being labeled as factors while
Figure 6. Multivariate and graphical approach to firewall log anomaly detection.
Table 2. Dataset variables.
Field name Description
Device Vendor Company who made the device
Device Product Name of the security device
Source Address IP address of the source
Destination Address IP address of the destination
Transport Protocol Transport protocol used
Bytes In Number of bytes transferred in
Bytes Out Number of bytes transferred out
Category Outcome Action taken by the device
Country_Name Country of the source IP address
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numerical variables being labeled as numeric (integer,
double, long, etc.). The number of levels associated
with a categorical variable then denote the number of
unique entries. For example, the Device_Name variable
has 19 levels in the example log file, indicating that
there are 19 different devices found in this dataset.
State vector creation
From the time blocks, numerical matrices are extracted
to prepare for statistical analysis. To apply the statisti-
cal methods discussed in “Developing a statistical
framework for cyber anomaly detection” section, we
employ TVA, which uses the feature vector creation
method of “Feature vector creation” section to take
the pre-defined data attributes and transform them
into representative counts using descriptive statistics.
Therefore, as each time block is generated, the categor-
ical fields are separated by their levels and a count of
occurrences for each level is recorded into a vector. All
numerical fields, such as bytes in and bytes out, are
recorded as a summation within the time block. Due
to the large number of levels associated with IP
addresses, only the top 10 source and destination IP
address counts are recorded. These vectors are then
aggregated into a single matrix, known as the state
vector matrix, as seen in Table 3. In Table 3, one sees
rows for time blocks 1–5 with a count of occurrences
for each device found in the data.
Multicollinearity adjustment
Prior to any statistical analysis, we automatically
inspect the state vector for multicollinearity issues.
This prevents us from inadvertently having issues
such as matrix singularity, rank deficiency, and strong
correlation values; this also removes any columns that
pose an issue. The conclusion of this step ensures the
data is ready for statistical analysis.
Before the statistical tools, mentioned in
“Developing a statistical framework for cyber anomaly
detection” section, are applied to the state vector
matrix, the columns of the state vector matrix must
meet three criteria: (1) the columns must have a vari-
ance greater than 0þD1 to avoid matrix singularity,
where D1  0.1; (2) the columns must be linearly inde-
pendent to avoid computational errors associated with
rank deficiency, consistent with;60 (3) the values of the
correlation matrix cannot exceed a threshold of 1D2,
where D2¼ 0.05. The identified columns are removed
and the reduced state vector matrix is ready for multi-
variate analysis.
Statistical analysis
Once the data has been pre-processed and made to
conform to general data quality expectations, our
data is ready for analysis. First we can build the
HMAT to serve as the foundation to subsequent anal-
ysis. From here, the further analysis is analyst driven
whereby three directions can be explored: within block
analytics, across block analytics, and graphi-
cal analytics.
The HMAT in this research utilizes the squared
Mahalanobis distance as an outlier detection metric
to determine the color of each time block in the
HMAT. The breakdown distance enhances
Figure 7. Sample of time block creation.
Table 3. Example state vector matrix.
ICMP No protocol TCP UDP /Attempt /Failure /Success No outcome Country 1 Country 10 Country 11
1 1 254 22 12 17 67 82 123 0 0 0
2 0 264 16 9 41 38 106 104 0 0 0
3 0 247 16 26 0 41 75 173 0 0 1
4 0 267 12 10 74 25 114 76 0 0 0
5 0 236 14 12 33 22 70 164 0 0 0
..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
.
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the HMAT by adjusting the size of the circles accord-
ing to its normalized value for each variable. Figure 8
shows the HMAT for the entire dataset, where each
row refers to a time block and each column represents
a variable. Using the Mahalanobis distance, the anom-
alous time blocks are distinguished by the darker shade
of blue. Then, to determine the size of the circle, we
normalize the breakdown distance for each column to
distinguish which variables contributed most to the
Mahalanobis distance value within each time block.
Thus, from Figure 8, we can observe the big picture
of potentially concentrated anomalies. The rows that
are shaded darker imply that they are anomalies rela-
tive to their MD. Then the columns that have larger
circles indicate those variables that are driving the MD
for that particular time block. Looking at Figure 8,
we identify the clearest anomalies shown in the lighter
blue with the largest circle as blocks 14, 27, 44, and 63.
We also recognize instances where sequential rows
appear in the top 20 time blocks, which suggests that
the block size may be too small. Moving forward with
our case study approach, we select block 14 for further
investigation.
Statistical analysis: Within blocks analytics
Once a time block has been selected for analysis,
we first explore within block analytics through the
Figure 8. Histogram matrix (all time blocks).
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use of histograms, as seen in Figure 9. Here, we com-
pare the counts of observations for particular attributes
within neighboring time blocks. Once an anomalous
time block is detected, histograms are generated to
compare the state vector values relative to neighboring
time blocks. The histogram shown in Figure 9 displays
the frequency of occurrences for the top five columns
with the largest BD value for block 14, relative to the
occurrences for neighboring time blocks. The purpose
is twofold: (1) observe the columns that cause the block
to be an anomaly and (2) take note of the temporal
relationship between the top five columns and the
time blocks.
Based on Figure 9, we further our recommendation
for a larger block size since blocks 13 and 14 both have
high values for Device 2 and the D2 variable. The des-
tination IP address labeled as D2 within block 14 is
destination IP IPAddress1.
Statistical analysis: Across blocks analytics
The next direction we explore in statistical analysis is
across block analytics. Using FA, we first explore the
factor loadings (correlations between the columns of
the state vector matrix and the suggested factors),
then we compare the factor scores against one another
for anomaly detection. To begin using factor analysis,
the dimensions of the reduced state vector matrix are
first passed to the Horn’s curve function to find the
recommended set of eigenvalues. Next, the dimension-
ality is determined by finding the eigenvalues of the
correlation matrix of the state vector matrix and retain-
ing only those factors whose eigenvalues are greater
than or equal to those produced by Horn’s curve.
The reduced state vector matrix and the number of
factors to retain are passed to the factor analysis func-
tion. Then, the factor analysis function generates two
sets of factor scores and factor loadings, unrotated and
rotated. Using the IFS values to assess the quality of
our solutions, we select the set of scores and loadings
associated with the larger IFS value. The factor
loadings are displayed in a correlation heatmap for
interpretation of the variable relationships. The factor
scores for each factor are plotted against one another
for graphical anomaly detection.
After performing factor analysis, we observe the IFS
levels presented in Table 2 to assess the quality of our
factor analysis solutions. The rotated IFS level is
higher than the original IFS level, serving as rationale
for using the rotated factor loadings and scores in the
subsequent analysis. According to Table 4, a value of
0.6125 is deemed as mediocre.
The heatmap in Figure 10 shows the correlation
between the columns of the reduced state vector to
the rotated factor loadings. Strong negative correla-
tions are depicted as red while strong positive correla-
tions are shown as blue. The factor loading breakdown
can provide insight into the relationships between var-
iables based on Figure 10. For example, in factor 5 we
see that the two devices, device 4 and device 13 are
directly related to the geographic variables Country 7
and Country 10. While the true relationship between
these variables is unknown, we may presume that these
devices are set up to capture signatures from those
locations. Looking at factor 1, we notice that four devi-
ces as well as the two main protocols are highly corre-
lated with observations coming from the geographic
locations of Country 16, Country 17, Country 18,
and Country 29. It is highly likely that these locations
are associated with known TOR exit nodes.
Interestingly, it also reinforces the relationship seen in
the histogram in Figure 8, where observations sourced
from Country 10 and detected by the Device 13 are
correlated with high occurrences.
The next step of FA involves projecting the data by
the factors. Figure 11 contains four subplots for this
step: the subplot in the top left plots rotated scores 1 on
the x-axis and rotated scored 2 on the y-axis; the sub-
plot in the top right plots rotated scores 3 on the x-axis
and rotated scored 4 on the y-axis; the subplot in the
bottom left plots rotated scores 5 on the x-axis and
rotated scored 6 on the y-axis; the subplot in the
bottom right plots rotated scores 3 on the x-axis and
rotated scored 5 on the y-axis. Although rotated scores
1 explains the most variation in the data, followed by
rotated scores 2 and so on, anomalies are not apparent
until one examines rotated scores 3 and 5. Based on
Figure 9. Block 14: top 5 breakdown distance columns.
Table 4. IFS results.
IFS level Evaluation
Original 0.5674 Miserable
Rotated 0.6125 Mediocre
IFS: index of factorial simplicity.
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Figure 10. Heatmap of rotated factor loadings.
Figure 11. Rotated factor score plots.
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these plots, we can clearly see the anomalous time
blocks, such as blocks 27, 63, 14, and 44.
Statistical analysis: Graphical analysis
The final analysis direction we examine is graphical
analytics. This encompasses both the HMAT and the
IP network graphs. The purpose of the network graphs
is to visualize the connections between source IP
addresses and the destination IP(s) they attempted to
connect to. While not directly a statistical technique,
this method allows for rapid visual cues to understand
the IP dynamics within the dataset or a specific
time block.
In Figure 12, we display the network graph for time
block 14. At first glance, there is a noticeably large
cluster on the bottom left (circled in red), where mul-
tiple nodes are connected to a single node. We take a
closer look at this region in Figure 13. Looking at
Figure 1, we first pinpoint the source IP address asb7-
fa0888.5aa3beb3.5aa3beb3.5aa3beb3. In the original
data set, the source IP address could not be identified
by the security device, either as a result of misconfigu-
ration or the source masking their IP address. Next,
we skim through the destination IP addresses con-
nected to the focal source IP address. Coincidentally,
we recognize the IP address 239e330c.4c3e44ed.
f54890e4.1a9d80ce (denoted by a red dot), which was
found to be the fifth highest variable causing time block
14 to be an anomaly. Then, we noticed a common
trend, where seven other destination IP addresses
began with 239e330c.4c3e44ed, three of which began
with 239e330c.4c3e44ed.f54890e4. This suggests that
the source IP address in this cluster was either attempt-
ing to perform a port scan, or attempting to fingerprint
the network.
Embedded analytics
Analytic capabilities within organizations have, histor-
ically, been dominated by proprietary software technol-
ogies. Unfortunately, these technologies often lack
availability, innovation, interoperability, flexibility,
and transparency.77 Likewise, to incorporate the ana-
lytic approach herein illustrated into existing proprie-
tary software used by cyber analysts would take
significant resources (i.e. time, money) of which most
organizations have little to spare. In recent years, there
has been an increased transition away from proprietary
software and towards open source software both within
the federal organizations and across industry. Open
source software is a software that is voluntarily devel-
oped and extended by users specific to their organiza-
tion’s needs and made freely available to all.78 For
analytic purposes, open source software allows analysts
to customize analytic processes and products specific to
their organization. Consequently, open source software
has emerged as a major cultural and economic phe-
nomenon79 and illustrates the trend toward developing
user innovation around analytic capabilities to increase
an organization’s performance.80 This collaborative
model offered by the open source ecosystem can poten-
tially change the analytic nature of organizations by
increasing innovation and technology adoption while
being constrained by resources.81
The transition towards open source software allows
us to operationalize and embed our analytic
approaches into systems and business processes for
more efficient analytic efforts.82 In this research, the
authors developed two forms of embedded analytics:
an open source R Package (anomalyDetection83) and
a Shiny Application which is employed by cyber ana-
lysts for operational analysis of log data.
Figure 12. Block 14 IP network graph.
Figure 13. Block 14 IP network cluster investigation.
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anomalyDetection R Package
anomalyDetection is an R package that provides quan-
titative cyber analysts the ability to effectively and effi-
ciently implement our methodology. anomalyDetection
provides 13 functions to aid in the detection of
potential cyber anomalies. These functions employ
the methods presented in this paper and described in
Gutierrez et al.84
Shiny Application
Due to the high volume of incoming data, cyber ana-
lysts may not always have the time available to manu-
ally compute and analyze the data for anomaly
detection using the anomalyDetection R package. To
fully integrate the authors’ methodology into the work-
flow of cyber analysts operating on a big data platform,
a web-based embedded analytic was developed so the
analysts can execute the analytic approach efficiently
over multiple time periods and data sources. R Shiny
was used to develop this second form of embedded
analytic. Shiny is an R package that provides an ele-
gant and powerful framework for building interactive
web applications using R. The web application pro-
vides means for the user to upload new data files,
adjust block sizes and the number of IP addresses to
consider. The web application will then perform the
analytic methodologies discussed throughout this
paper and provide results in the form of interactive
graphics and tables to help the cyber analyst detect
anomalies. This provides an efficient approach for
cyber analysts to effectively analyze significant
amounts of data while ensuring the methodological
approach is valid and consistent. Example screenshots
of the transitioned tool are presented in Figure 14.
Conclusions
Cyber attacks continue to be a growing concern for
organizations. Unfortunately, the process of analyzing
log files has, historically, been unorganized and lacked
efficient approaches. This research presented an
analyst-aided approach that makes the log file analysis
process more efficient and facilitates the identification
and analysis of potential anomalies. First, a state
vector approach was developed to facilitate the identi-
fication and analysis of anomalies in log files. Second,
multivariate statistics and graphical methods such as
the Mahalanobis distance, factor analysis, and histo-
gram matrices were combined in an analyst centric
approach for outlier detection. Fourth, this research
introduces the breakdown distance heuristic as a
decomposition of the Mahalanobis distance, by indi-
cating which variables and time blocks contributed
most to its value. Finally, we illustrated how open
source programming was used to operationalize our
methodology.
Consequently, this research contributes to the field
of network intrusion detection by demonstrating
Figure 14. Screenshots of embedded web analytics application.
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a comprehensive systems engineering approach to pre-
pare log file data, apply multivariate and graphical
methods to narrow the search window for log file anal-
ysis, and embed the analytic process to ensure anomaly
detection approaches are reproducible and efficient-
ly deployed.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Bradley C Boehmke http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3611-8516
References
1. Liao HJ, Lin CHR, Lin YC, et al. Intrusion detection
system: a comprehensive review. J Netw Comput Appl
2013; 36: 16–24.
2. Sammons J. Digital forensics: threatscape and best prac-
tices. Maryland Heights, MO: Syngress, 2015.
3. Sammons J. The basics of digital forensics: the primer for
getting started in digital forensics. Amsterdam,
Netherlands: Elsevier, 2012.
4. Suh-Lee C, Jo JY and Kim Y. Text mining for security
threat detection discovering hidden information in
unstructured log messages. In: IEEE conference on
communications and network security (CNS),
Philadelphia, PA, 17–19 October 2016, pp.252–260.
5. Breier J and Branisova´ J. A dynamic rule creation based
anomaly detection method for identifying security
breaches in log records. Wireless Pers Commun 2017;
94: 497–511.
6. Villa E, Zidaritz A, Varga MD, et al. Active firewall
system and methodology. Patent 6,550,012, USA, 2003.
7. Samuelson DA. Using big data in cybersecurity. ORMS-
Today 2016; 43.
8. Toth T and Kruegel C. Evaluating the impact of auto-
mated intrusion response mechanisms. In: Computer
security applications conference, Washington, DC, 9–13
December 2002, pp.301–310.
9. Inayat Z, Gani A, Anuar NB, et al. Intrusion response
systems: foundations, design, and challenges. J Netw
Comput Appl 2016; 62: 53–74.
10. Stakhanova N, Bas US and Wong J. A taxonomy of
intrusion response systems. IJICS 2007; 1: 169–184.
11. Goodall JR, Lutters WG and Komlodi A. Developing
expertise for network intrusion detection. Info Technol
People 2009; 22: 92–108.
12. Jayathilake D. Towards structured log analysis. In:
International joint conference on computer science and
software engineering (JCSSE), UTCC, Bangkok,
Thailand, 30 May–1 June 2012, pp.259–264.
13. Jain AK, Duin RPW and Mao J. Statistical pattern rec-
ognition: a review. IEEE Trans Pattern Anal Mach Intell
2000; 22: 4–37.
14. Abbott RG, McClain J, Anderson B, et al. Log analysis
of cyber security training exercises. Procedia Manuf 2015;
3: 5088–5094.
15. Goodall JR, Lutters WG and Komlodi A. Supporting
intrusion detection work practice. J Inf Syst Secur
2009; 5: 42–73.
16. Bihl TJ, Young WA and Weckman GR. Defining, under-
standing, and addressing big data. Int J Bus Anal IJBAN
2016; 3: 1–32.
17. Zamani M and Movahedi M. Machine learning techni-
ques for intrusion detection. arXiv 2013; 1312.2177: 1–11.
18. Lazarevic A, Ertoz L, Kumar V, et al. A comparative
study of anomaly detection schemes in network intrusion
detection. In: SIAM conference on data mining, San
Francisco, CA, 1–3 May 2003, pp.25–36.
19. Denning DE. An intrusion-detection model. IIEEE Trans
Software Eng 1987; 222–232.
20. Garcıa-Teodoro P, Dıaz-Verdejo J, Macia´-Ferna´ndez G,
et al. Anomaly-based network intrusion detection: tech-
niques, systems and challenges. Comput Secur 2009;
28: 18–28.
21. Grimaila MR, Myers J, Mills RF, et al. Design and anal-
ysis of a dynamically configured log-based distributed
security event detection methodology. J Defense Model
Simul Appl Methodol Technol 2011; 9: 219–241.
22. Moore KL, Bihl TJ, Bauer KW, et al. Feature extraction
and feature selection for classifying cyber traffic threats.
J Defense Model Simul 2017; 14: 217–231.
23. Dube TE, Raines RA, Grimaila MR, et al. Malware
target recognition of unknown threats. IEEE Syst J
2013; 7: 467–477.
24. Shilland GR. Host-based multivariate statistical computer
operating process anomaly intrusion detection system
(PAIDS). MS Thesis, Air Force Institute of
Technology, United States, 2009.
25. Shen K, Stewart C, Li C, et al. Reference-driven perfor-
mance anomaly identification. ACM Sigmetrics Perform
Eval Rev 2009; 37: 85–96.
26. Stewart C, Shen K, Iyengar A, et al. Entomomodel:
understanding and avoiding performance anomaly
manifestations. In: IEEE international symposium on
modeling, analysis & simulation of computer and telecom-
munication systems (MASCOTS), Miami Beach, FL, 17–
19 August 2010.
27. Winding R, Wright T and Chapple M. System anomaly
detection: mining firewall logs. Securecomm and work-
shops, 2006, pp.1–5.
28. Frei A and Rennhard M. Histogram Matrix: log file visu-
alization for anomaly detection. In: 3rd international con-
ference on availability, security, and reliability (ARES),
Barcelona, Spain, 4–7 March 2008, pp.610–617.
29. Breier J and Branisova J. Anomaly detection from log
files using data mining techniques. Inf Sci Appl
2015: 449–457.
308 Journal of Algorithms & Computational Technology 12(4)
30. Abad C, Taylor J, Sengul C, et al., Log correlation for
intrusion detection: a proof of concept. In: Annual com-
puter security applications conference (ACSAC), Las
Vegas, NV, 8–12 December 2003, pp.255–264.
31. Cohen I, Chase J, Goldszmidt M, et al. Correlating
instrumentation data to system states: a building block
for automated diagnosis and control. OSDI 2004; 1–15.
32. Cohen I, Zhang S, Goldszmidt M, et al. Capturing,
indexing, clustering, and retrieving system history.
Sigops Oper Syst Rev 2005; 39: 105–118.
33. Cavusoglu H, Raghunathan S and Cavusoglu H.
Configuration of and interaction between information
security technologies: the case of firewalls and intrusion
detection systems. Inf Syst Res 2009; 20: 198–217.
34. Al-Shaer ES and Hamed HH. Discovery of policy anom-
alies in distributed firewalls. In: Joint conference of the
IEEE computer and communications societies
(INFOCOM), Hong Kong, China, 22 November 2004,
pp.2605–2616.
35. Wu C-HJ and Irwin JD. Introduction to computer net-
works and cybersecurity. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC
Press, 2016.
36. Patton S, Doss D and Yurcik W. Open source versus
commercial firewalls: functional comparison. In: IEEE
conference on local computer networks, Tampa, Florida,
8–12 November 2000, pp.223–224.
37. Scarfone K and Mell P. Guide to intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDPS). National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2007.
38. Levitt K. Intrusion detection: current capabilities and
future directions. In: 18th annual computer security appli-
cations conference, Las Vegas, NV, 9–13 December 2002,
pp.365–367.
39. Graham R. FAQ: firewall forensics (what am i seeing?),
http://web.archive.org/web/20040804051425/http://www.
robertgraham.com/pubs/firewall-seen.html (2003,
accessed 10 February 2017).
40. Duda RO, Hart PE and Stork DG. Pattern classification.
Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
41. Morin B, Me´ L, Debar H, et al. A logic-based model to
support alert correlation in intrusion detection. Inf Fusion
2009; 10: 285–299.
42. Zhang JZJ and Zulkernine MZM. Anomaly based net-
work intrusion detection with unsupervised outlier
detection. In: IEEE international conference on communi-
cations, Istanbul, Turkey, 11–15 June 2006,
pp.2388–2393.
43. Ren P, Gao Y, Li Z, et al. IDGraphs: intrusion detection
and analysis using histographs. Visual Comput Secur
VizSEC 2005; 39–46.
44. Yin X, Yurcik W and Slagell A. The design of
VisFlowConnect-IP: a link analysis system for IP security
situational awareness. Third IEEE international workshop
on information assurance (IWIA), College Park, MD, 23–
24 March 2005, pp.141–153.
45. Gu G, Porras P, Yegneswaran V, et al. BotHunter:
detecting malware infection through IDS-driven dialog
correlation. In: Proceedings of the 16th USENIX security
symposium, Boston, MA, 6–10 August 2007.
46. Lee J, Jeon J, Lee C, et al. A study on efficient log visu-
alization using D3 component against APT: how to visu-
alize security logs efficiently? In: 2016 international
conference on platform technology and service, Jeju,
Korea, 15–17 February 2016, pp.1–6.
47. Shyu ML, Chen SC, Sarinnapakorn K, et al. A novel
anomaly detection scheme based on principal component
classifier. In: IEEE international conference on data
mining, Melbourne, FL, 22 November 2003, pp.353–365.
48. Wang W and Battiti R. Identifying intrusions in comput-
er networks with principal component analysis. In: First
international conference on availability, reliability and
security (ARES), Vienna, Austria, 20–22 April 2006,
pp.270–277.
49. Denning DE. An intrusion-detection model. IEEE Trans
Software Eng 1987; 2: 222–232.
50. Lazarevic A, Kumar V and Srivastava J. Intrusion
detection: a survey.Managing Cyber Threats 2005; 19–78.
51. Ahmed M, Naser Mahmood A and Hu J. A survey of
network anomaly detection techniques. J Netw Comput
Appl 2016; 60: 19–31.
52. Patcha A and Park JM. An overview of anomaly detec-
tion techniques: existing solutions and latest technologi-
cal trends. Comput Netw 2007; 51: 3448–3470.
53. Van Vleet G. 2d regional cyber center opens, https://
www.army.mil/article/114105/ (2013, accessed 1
January 2016).
54. Syurahbil S, Ahmad N, Zolkipli MF, et al. Intrusion
preventing system using intrusion detection system deci-
sion tree data mining. Am J Eng Appl Sci 2009;
2: 721–725.
55. Mahalanobis PC. On the generalized distance in statis-
tics. Proc Natl Inst Sci (Calcutta) 1936: 49–55.
56. Dillon WR and Goldstein M. Multivariate analysis:
methods and applications. Hoboken, New Jersey: John
Wiley & Sons, 1984.
57. Spearman CE. The abilities of man: their nature and mea-
surement. London: The Macmillan Company, 1927.
58. Osborne JW and Costello AB. Best practices in explor-
atory factor analysis : four recommendations for getting
the most from your analysis. Pan-Pacific Manage Rev
2005; 2: 131–146.
59. Kaiser HF. The varimax criterion for analytic rotation in
factor analysis. Psychometrika 1958; 23: 187–200.
60. Kaiser HF. An index of factorial simplicity.
Psychometrika 1974; 39: 31–36.
61. Jackson DA. Stopping rules in principal component
analysis: a comparison of heuristical and statistical
approaches. Ecology 1993; 74: 2204–2214.
62. Kaiser HF. The application of electronic computers to
factor analysis. Educ Psychol Meas 1960; 20: 141–151.
63. Cattell RB. The scree test for the number of factors.
Multivariate Behav Res 1966; 1: 245–276.
64. Horn JL. A rationale and test for the number of factors
in factor analysis. Psychometrika 1965; 30: 179–185.
65. Siddiqui T, Kim A, Lee J, et al. Effortless data explora-
tion with zenvisage: an expressive and interactive
visual analytics system. Proc VLDB Endow 2016;
10: 457–648.
Gutierrez et al. 309
66. Schweitzer D and Fulton S. Visualization in information
security. In: 7th international conference on information
warfare and security (ICIW), Seattle, WA, 22–23
March 2012, p.288.
67. Wilkinson L and Friendly M. The history of the cluster
heat map. Am Stat 2009; 63: 179–184.
68. Hojsgaard S, Edwards D and Lauritzen S. Graphical
models with R. New York, NY: Springer Science &
Business Media, 2012.
69. Freeman LC. Visualizing social networks. J Soc Struct
2000; 1.
70. Goldschlag DM, Reed MG and Syverson PF. Hiding
routing information. International workshop on informa-
tion hiding, 1996, pp.137–150.
71. Buxton J and Bingham T. The rise and challenge of dark
net drug markets. Policy Brief 2015; 7.
72. Teo L. Port scans and ping sweeps explained. Linux J
2000; 80.
73. Maybaum M. Technical methods, techniques, tools and
effects of cyber operations. In: Peacetime regime for state
activities in cyberspace. International law, international
relations and diplomacy. Tallinn: NATO CCD COE
Publication, 2013, pp.103–131.
74. Swanson I. Malware, viruses and log visualisation. In:
Australian digital forensics conference, 2008, pp.1–10.
75. R. Core Team R. A language and environment for statis-
tical computing. Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical
Computing, 2016.
76. Cass S. The top 10 programming languages spectrum’s.
IEEE Spectr 2014; 51: 68 [DataFlow].
77. Doig C. The journey to open data science. Continuum
Analytics, 2017.
78. O’Mahony S. Guarding the commons: how community
managed software projects protect their work. Res Policy
2003; 32: 1179–1198.
79. Lerner J and Tirole J. Some simple economics of open
source. J Ind Econ 2002; 50: 197–234.
80. Von Hippel E. Democratizing innovation: the evolving
phenomenon of user innovation. Int J Innovation Sci
2009; 1: 29–40.
81. Huizingh EK. Open innovation: state of the art and
future perspectives. Technovation 2011; 31: 2–9.
82. Boehmke BC and Hazen BT. The future of supply chain
information systems: The open source ecosystem. Global
J Flexible Syst Manage 2017; 18: 163–168.
83. Gutierrez RJ, Boehmke BC, Bauer KW, et al.
anomalyDetection: implementation of augmented net-
work log anomaly detection procedures. R J 2017;
9: 354–365.
84. Chang W, Cheng J, Allaire J, et al. Shiny: web applica-
tion framework for R, R package version 1.0.0, 2017.
310 Journal of Algorithms & Computational Technology 12(4)
